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INTRODUCTION 1 
A. Purpose of the Analysis 
A wide variety of instruments and mechanisms for the regulation 
and control of chemicals and pesticides is already available interna-
tionally. What is missing is an analysis that attempts to systematize 
the different approaches, to create transparency, to define where they 
overlap, and to discover prospective deficiencies and shortcomings. In 
order to accomplish this task, this article covers legally binding rules 
as well as recommendations and codes - the international soft law. 
The overall purpose is to outline a framework for future international 
regulation of chemicals and pesticides and to propose an international 
convention as a possible solution. 2 
B. Points Needing Analysis 
International legal instruments require discussion, not only to de-
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te~mine the scope of this article but also to establish a framework that 
facilitates policy formulation in the field of chemicals and pesticides. 
The London Guidelines, 3 like a number of other national initia-
tives, cover both chemicals and pesticides. Bringing together chemi-
cals and pesticides in a single report entails a number of difficulties. 
Chemicals and pesticides follow different regulatory schemes, at least 
in the legislation of industrialized countries. This might be different in 
developing countries, but the more the legislation is scrutinized the 
more apparent it becomes that each product category, whether chemi-
cals, pesticides, food additives, cosmetics, or medicines, is dealt with 
separately. International regulation must consider these differences 
and respond to product-specific national rules. 
United Nations Environment Programme Governing Council 
(UNEP GC) Decision 15/30 refers to "other activities related to the 
production and use of chemicals."4 This statement is unclear. Inter-
national regulation might cover trade in chemicals, but it might also 
cover production, as is the case with the International Labour Organi-
sation (ILO) Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at 
Work. 5 A distinction can be made between process regulation and 
product regulation:6 process regulation aims at the manufacturing 
process, product regulation at trade. This article mainly focuses on 
product regulation, but process regulation is considered with respect 
to the feasibility of banning the production, as opposed to merely the 
use, of certain extremeJy dangerous chemicals and pesticides. 
The last point needing clarification concerns the types of instru-
ments available for international pesticide and chemical regulation. 
One possibility is harmonization of the different national approaches 
in order to define a level of protection and control with worldwide 
acceptability. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organiza~ 
tion (FAO) International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and 
Use of Pesticides7 is an example of such harmonization. Another pos-
3. UNEP LONDON GVIDELINES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON CHF.MlCALS lN 
INTERNATIONAL Tu.DE (A.mended 1989). [hereinafter AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES]. 
4. Decision 15/30 of the Goveming Council of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, Environmental/y Safe Management of Chemicals, in Particular Those That Are Banned 
and Severely Restricted in International Trade, reprinted in 19 ENVTL. PoL'Y & L. 125 (1989). 
5. International Labour Organisation, Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals 
ar Work, art. 2(c)(i), 73 OFFICIAL BULL. 71, 73 (1990) [hereinaftcr ILO Convention]. 
6. ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY 
(Integration Through Law„ Europe and the A.merican FederaJ Experience vol. 2, Maure Cappel-
letti et al. eds., 1985). 
1. United Nations FAO Conference Resolution 10/85 International Code of Conduct on the 
Distribution and Use of Pesticides, [Reference Binder 1] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:3001 (1985) 
[hereinafter FAO Code of ConductJ. 
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sibility would be to allow regulatory diff erences but develop mecha-
nisms to bridge those differences, especially between exporting and 
importing countries. The London Guidelines8 and other efforts9 to 
regulate the export of banned and severely restricted products are in 
this category. The intention is not to abolish existing ditferences in the 
legal status of regulated chemicals and pesticides but to find ways to 
secure their trade even though they are banned or severely restricted. 
lt is therefore necessary to clearly distinguish between etforts that at-
tempt to harmonize international regulation and efforts that aim to 
balance diff erences in the regulatory status of chemicals and pesticides. 
C. Scope of the Analysis 
This article cannot be restricted to international etforts. lt must 
consider the key role of some industrialized countries in chemical and 
pesticide regulation. Specifi.c emphasis is put on the rote of the Euro-
pean Community (EC). With its policy of completing the intemal 
market by 1992, 10 the EC has become the most important interna-
tional organization in developing regulatory frameworks that unite 
different national schemes. European initiatives to harmonize chemi-
cal and pesticide regulations are important far beyond the borders of 
the twelve Member States. Due to the enormous importance of the 
EC market to European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, 
the Europeanization of chemical and pesticide regulation based on 
Community law is close at band. International efforts to regulate pes-
ticides and chemicals by the F AO, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), and the ILO can be analyzed against the back-
ground of the numerous regulatory efforts of the European Commu-
nity and industrialized countries. 
The different national, regional, and international laws and regula-
tions will be dealt with by following the development of regulatory 
instruments and strategies designed to control risks to humans and to 
the environment. Regulation traditionally starts in industrialized 
countries with efforts to manage trade in chemicals and pesticides. 11 
The overall goal is to protect both the user of the prod uct and those 
workers who may come into contact with it. Therefore, regulations 
8. AMENOED LONDON GUIDEUNES, supra note 3. 
9. See infra Part I(E). 
10. For an analysis, see generally 1992: ÜNE EUROPEAN MARKET? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF "fHE CoMMlSSION'S lNTERNAL MARKET STRATEGY (Roland Bieber et al. eds., 1988). 
11. See Hans-W. Micklitz, Zur Geschichte des deutschen Pflanzenschutzrechts, in BREMER 
KOLLOQUIUM ÜBER PFLANZENSCHUTZ 44 (Eckard Rehbinder ed„ 1991) (concerning the his-
tory of regulation of pesticides). 
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are adopted to classify products according to risk, to ensure adequate 
packaging and labeling, and to control advertising. Later, regulatory 
emphasis shifts from trade regulation to access-to-market regulation. 
States protect their citizens and the environment against harm from 
dangerous chemicals and pesticides by controlling market access. 
There are different regulatory models, notification procedures, re-
gistration procedures, and/or licensing procedures, but they all try to 
guarantee preventive protection against potential risks. The shift from 
trade regulation to access-to-market regulation logically increases the 
degree of protection, but even access-to-market rules cannot guarantee 
sufficient long-term protection to humans and the environment. A 
common characteristic of chemicals and pesticides is that their specific 
risks are unknown when they are brought onto the market and only 
become clear after years of use and experience. Then the question 
arises as to how, and even if, these products can be taken oft' the mar-
ket. The term of art for regulatory eff orts to rid the market of danger-
ous products is postmarket control. 12 
The analysis of export regulation focuses on existing mechanisms 
used by international and regional organizations (e.g., UNEP, FAO, 
the United Nations (U.N.), the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), the GATT, and the EC) and by vari-
ous States to regulate the exports of chemicals. Information exchange 
procedures, export notification, and the recently introduced Prior In-
formed Consent (PIC) procedure define the requirements for trade 
with banned and severely restricted chemicals. 
I. NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
PESTICIDES AND CHEMICALS 
A. Regulatory Concepts, Common Goals, and Definitions 
The overall trend in chemical and pesticide regulation is to go be-
yond the protection of humans against exposure to chemicals and pes-
ticides and to integrate the protection of the environment into the 
regulatory framework. This extension entails a shift from protection 
against acute damage or imminent danger to a consideration of poten-
tial hazards. 13 Regulatory actions are no longer limited to cases of 
actual harm. They now aim at protecting humans and the environ-
ment against the risks associated with chemicals. Therefore, the no-
12. See POST MARKET CONTROL OF CONSUMER Goons (Zentrum für Europäische Recht-
spolitik [ZERP} Schriftenreihe, Band 11, Hans·W. Micklitz ed., 1990) (discussing the concept of 
postmarket controls in comparative perspective). 
13. Pesticides legislation aimed first at the protection of humans. In a second step, the legis-
lation was extended to cover protection of the environment. 
Spring 1992] Chemicals and Pesticides 657 
tions of "risk," "hazard," and "<langer" are crucial in all laws and 
regulations. 14 
Protection against risks may be incorporated in a particular law in 
different ways. The OECD Paper on Administrative and Legislative 
Aspects of Chemical Control, 15 as well as the UNEP Comparative 
Survey of National N otification Procedures and Legislative Defini-
tions, 16 distinguishes among: 
( 1) the notion of risk being incorporated in the general statement of pur-
pose or goals provisions of a particular law; 
(2) the notion of risk being incorporated in statutory provisions that de-
scribe individual duties of care, especially in countries that vest in the 
manufacturer or importer the primary responsibility for assessing the 
risks associated with chemicals; 
(3) the notion of risk being incorporated by chemical laws in a number 
of risk categories representing defined dangerous properties of chemicals; 
and 
(4) the notion of risk being incorporated in statutory provisions that au-
thorize agencies to take specific regulatory action. 17 
Further details can be drawn from the OECD and UNEP papers. 18 
The overall trends reported in these two analyses have been 
strengthened and specified. No common approach, however, can be 
found in the answers to the questions of whether and to what extent 
occupational health and safety considerations should be integrated 
into chemical and pesticide regulation. For some countries, occupa· 
tional health and safety regulations are crucial for the development of 
sophisticated chemical regulation (e.g., the United Kingdom). 19 Other 
countries integrate aspects of occupational health and safety into 
chemical and pesticide regulation (e.g., Germany's Gefahr-
stoffverordnung). 20 
The integration of environmental protection into chemical and pes-
ticide regulation constitutes a shift from product-related to media-re-
lated regulation. Product-related regulation focuses on the specific 
risks of the respective products (e.g., chemicals, pesticides); media-re· 
14. See ECKARD REHBINDER ET AL., CHEMIKALIENGESETZ-KOMMENTAR UND RECHTS-
VORSCHRJFTEN ZUM CHEMIKALIENRECHT 37 (1985). 
15. OECD CoMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1. 
16. UNEP CoMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1. 
17. See OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note l, at 7, 10. 
18. Id.; see also UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1. 
19. See OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note l, at 5, 7, 11-13, 18-24, 27. 
20. Eckard Rehbinder, Harmonisierung des Chemikalienrechts?: Die Harmonisierungs-
wirkungen der Richtlinie 791831/EWG in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 
im Lichte des deutschen Rechts, in 3 CHEMIKALJENRECHT 79-139 (Gesellschaft für Rechtspolitik 
1986). The report is an analysis of the implementation of the Sixth Amendment of the Chemicals 
Directive. 
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lated regulation provides for the protection of humans and environ-
ment independent of the nature of the respective product. A media-
related approach encompasses all kinds of products - chemicals, pes-
ticides, medicines, food additives, cosmetics - and questions the ex-
tent to which criteria can be found to protect humans and the 
environment against potential risks. Even modern chemical laws do 
not really pursue a media-related approach.21 Some rules contain ele-
ments of a media-related approach, but exception clauses make clear 
that product-related regulations overrule media-related controls. 22 
This differentiation, which is quite common in most of the industrial-
ized countries, leads to the paradoxical consequence that the ultimate 
use determines the applicable legislation. In other words, pesticides, 
medicines, food additives, and cosmetics are all "chemicals," but their 
different uses make it necessary to decide whether to apply specific 
product-related Iaws or the basic chemical regulations. That is why 
chemical regulation, in practice, focuses on industrial chemicals as a 
specific category of products, distinguishing them from pesticides and 
other "chemicals" like medicines or food additives. 
Product-related regulation requires a definition of legal scope. 
There is no common understanding of the terms "chemical" and "pes-
ticide." In the field of chemicals, specific difficulties arise in differenti-
ating between industrially manufactured chemicals and preparations. 
European Economic Community (EEC) Directive 67 /548 (as 
amended by the Sixth Amendment) (dangerous substances))23 and EC 
Directive 91/414/EEC (pesticides)24 provide some guidance on what 
is meant by the terms chemical and pesticide. Guidance does not 
mean that all possible problems are solved. lt remains unclear 
whether preparations containing a chemical regulated by the Sixth 
Amendment fall under the Sixth Amendment or are excluded from 
that directive. 2s The OECD has developed a glossary of definitions 
used by industrialized States, mainly OECD members, in their chemi-
21. See Council Directive 79/831of18 September 1979 Amending for the Sixth Time Direc-
tive 67 /548/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions 
Relating to the Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances, pmbl. & art. l, 
1979 0.J. (L 259) 10-11 [hereinafter Sixth Amendment]. This Counci] Directive is a typical 
product of an ambitious approach. Starting from a broad concept of protection which ap-
proaches media-related thinking, the Directive's scope is narrower than would be expected from 
the preamble. See also OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, tbl. 3, at 16. 
22. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, tbl. 3, at 16. 
23. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 2(1)(a)-(b), at 11. 
24. Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 Conceming the Placing of Plant Protec-
tion Products on the Market, art. 2(1) & (3), 1991 O.J. (L 230) l, 3. 
25. Rehbinder, supra note 20. 
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cal legislation. 26 The glossary is helpful in understanding regulatory 
differences, but at the same time it shows that there is not yet a com-
mon understanding, even among the industrialized nations. 
The same is more or less true for the defi.nition of pesticides. EC 
Directive 91/414/EEC provides a common framework for the Mem-
ber States, but its definition differs from the notion in the U.S. Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 27 From an in-
ternational perspective, the FAQ Code of Conduct on the Distribution 
and Use of Pesticides supplies a glossary instrumental to the interna-
tional regulation of pesticides. 28 
As to the selection of control action, there are still substantial dif-
ferences in the language and the structure of the laws.29 The relation-
ship between different levels of risks, the basis of their determination, 
and the selection of control action is subject to different national regu-
latory approaches. One might summarize the findings of the OECD 
Analysis and the UNEP Comparative Survey as formulating a "hier-
archical system" that links diff ering degrees of risks to the selection of 
control action. 30 Under this system, levels of control stringency are 
triggered by corresponding levels of risk. There is an interdependence 
between the degree of risk and the intensity of regulation. 31 
Medern chemical and pesticide laws do not require a causal link 
between a substance and its potential hazards. 32 Statistical evidence 
and scientific research indicating that a hazard exists usually suffices 
to legitimate preventive action. However, the mere potential of a risk 
does not justify measures as severe as restricting or banning the use or 
production of a specific chemical or pesticide. More concrete evidence 
is needed for such actions. One might even conclude from the experi-
ence with chemical and pesticide legislation in industrialized countries 
that market restrictions are adopted only in cases where the causal 
link between the damage and the substance can no langer be denied. 
Although it is already a long way from the potential risk to the acute 
risk, there is a third category that requires an even higher degree of 
risk than in the case of market restriction: emergency situations. 
26. OECD, CHEMICALS CONTROL LEGISLATION AN INTERNATIONAL GI.OSSARY OF KEY 
TERMS (1982). 
27. Compare Council Directive 91/414/EEC, supra note 24, art. 2(1) & (3), at 3 with tbe 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1988). 
28. F AO Code of Conduct, supra note 7. 
29. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 23-24; OECD COMPARATIVE ANALY-
SIS, supra note 1, at 14. 
30. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 23. 
31. Id. 
32. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note l, at 14. 
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Here, the existence of an imminent danger triggers intervention to mit-
igate the risk.33 
Other countries leave their agencies more discretion in selecting 
appropriate controls. This is particularly true for the United States 
where there is a sequence of increasingly stringent prerequisites (in 
terms of probability of risks and necessary basis for their determina-
tion), from requiring testing in order to gather sufficient information 
to final control action. 34 Although the regulatory approach of the Eu-
ropean Community and its Member States on the one band and the 
United States on the other seems tobe different, in actual practice the 
similarity in interdependence between the degree of risk and selection 
of control action is striking. 
Some inherent limits are, though varying in their legal grounding, 
recognized in most legal systems. These limiting rules, according to 
the OECD Report, require agencies: 
a) not to overstep the limits of discretion set out in a law or inherently 
contained in a delegation of powers; 
b) not to disregard the scope of discretion available under a legal 
authorization; 
c) to make use of the discretionary powers in a fair and reasonable man-
ner, avoiding arbitrariness, clear errors of judgment and other abuses of 
discretion. 35 
Tables in the Report help the reader to visualize the linkage between 
control action and the degree of danger. 36 They show a complicated 
and sophisticated system that leaves some doubt as to whether the 
finely tuned differences in hazards and actions are manageable by the 
agenc1es. 
In adopting specific legislation on chemicals and pesticides, States 
are assuming the responsibility to protect their citizens and the envi-
ronment against risks resulting from unsafe chemicals and pesticides. 
Accepting a statutory responsibility for human safety and the environ-
ment entails far-reaching constitutional consequences. 37 lt is no 
langer the liberal State guaranteeing individual rights to liberty and 
freedom. Rather, it is the new welfare State accepting the responsibil-
ity to ensure protection, safety, and a healthy environment. Such an 
extension of responsibilities is not limited to industrialized countries. 
33. UNEP CoMPARATJVE SURVEY, supra note l, at 23. This is the system that exists in the 
European Community and its Member States. 
34. Id. 
35. OECD COMPARAT!VE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
36. ld. tbls. 2 & 4, at 13, 21. 
37. See genera/ly Hans-W. Micklitz, Consumer Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY: THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 53, 72-89 (Andrew C]apham et al. eds., 1991) 
[hereinafter Consumer Rights]. 
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Here, the rights of classical liberalism might be interpreted in light of 
the new statutory functions as is the case in Germany. New democra-
cies like Spain and Portugal have used their Constitutions to make the 
protection of humans and the environment a State objective, even a 
constitutional task. 38 However, even where health, safety, and envi-
ronmental protection are not discussed at the constitutional level, the 
existence of a statutory responsibility is widely accepted. The U.S. 
Constitution does not recognize social rights;39 its protection is limited 
to the classical liberal rights - individual liberty and freedom. Never-
theless, the United States has within the last twenty years developed 
the furthest-reaching statutes designed to guarantee the protection of 
humans and the environment against chemicals, pesticides, and other 
devices.40 
At the international level, article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights includes a right to health,41 
and the 1972 Stockholm Declaration established the agenda for later 
international efforts to guarantee a healthy environment. 42 The legal 
status of these documents remains the subject of a controversial de-
bate, but their mere existence makes it clear that, even in the interna-
tional arena, rights to safety and a healthy environment are now 
important considerations. Both could establish the structure for the 
legitimate development of an international regime for the regulation of 
chemicals and pesticides. In the long run, trade regulations have to 
account for health, safety, and environmental concerns.43 
B. Classification, Labeling, Packaging, and Advertising 
In the history of chemical and pesticide regulation, rules on risk 
classification, on associating specific risks to labeling requirements, 
and on packaging were the first step in the development of chemical 
and pesticide regulation. 
38. ld. at 80-89. 
39. 1 EBERHARD ÜRABITZ, GRUNDRECHTE IN EUROPA UND USA: STRUKTUREN NATIO-
NALER SYSTEME (1986). 
40. See Giandomenico Majone, Cross-National Sources of Regulatory Policymaking in Eu-
rope and the United States, J. Pua. PoL'Y, Spring 1991, at 79, 90-91, 98. 
41. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, art. 12(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8, 6 I.L.M. 360, 363-64 (entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976). For further details, see Consumer Rights, supra note 37, at 92-94. 
42. See Alston, supra note 2, at 410-12, 419 & 432. 
43. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Ejfective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries: Inter-
national Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses and the GATT, 70 MICH. L. REV. 859 (1972); 
see also ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1982); 
Helmut Gröner, Umweltschutzbedingte Produktnormen als nichttarifiires Handelshemmnis, in 
UMWELTPOLITIK UND WETTBEWERB 143 (Helmut Gut:z.ler ed., 1981). 
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1. Classification 
The Sixth Amendment to EEC Directive 67 /548/EEC provides 
fourteen factors f or determining hazardous characteristics within the 
meaning of the directive: explosive, oxidizing, extremely flammable, 
highly flammable, ftammable, very toxic, toxic, harmful, corrosive, ir-
ritant, dangerous for the environment, carcinogenic, teratogenic, and 
mutagenic.44 EC Directive 78/631 provides a similar classification 
scheme for pesticides, ranking them from very toxic, through toxic, to 
harmful. Classification is based primarily on the acute oral and der-
mal toxicity to rats in accord with the standard procedures in toxicol-
ogy. 45 EC Directive 88/3 79 extends classification to preparations 
other than pesticides.46 The classi:fication scheme follows the princi-
ples laid down in Directive 67 /548 on dangerous chemical substances, 
supplemented by specific provisions on explosiveness, oxidizing ten-
dencies, extreme flammability, high flammability, or fiammability. 47 
These three directives provide a common classification scheme of dan-
gerous substances, pesticides, and preparations throughout the Euro-
pean Community. They facilitate orientation on the market and 
enhance the development of regulatory concepts based on 
classification. 
At the international level, numerous organizations have developed 
classification schemes, for example, the efforts of the W orld Health 
Organization (WHO) and of the International Register for Potentially 
Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) in the fields of chemicals and pesticides. 
However, most of these classification systems are not linked to labeling 
and packaging requirements. There are two notable differences. The 
ILO Convention requires specific criteria and systems appropriate for 
the classification of all chemicals according to the type and degree of 
their intrinsic hazards.48 According to the ILO Convention's Recom-
mendations, classification should be based on characteristics such as: 
toxic properties, including both acute and chronic health effects in all 
target organs; chemical or physical characteristics, including flamma-
bility, explosiveness, oxidizing properties, and dangerous reactivity; 
corrosive and irritant properties; carcinogenic effects; allergenic and 
44. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 2(2), at 11-12. 
45. Council Directive 78/631 of 26 June 1978 on the Approximation of the Laws of the 
Member States Relating to the Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Prepara-
tions (pesticides), art. 3, 1978 O.J. (L 206) 13, 14-15. 
46. Council Directive 88/379 of7 June 1988 on the Approximation ofthe Laws, Regulations 
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Relating to the Classification, Packaging 
and Labelling of Dangerous Preparations, art. 3, 1988 O.J. (L 187) 14, 15-22. 
47. /d. 
48. ILO Convention, supra note 5, art. 6, at 73. 
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sensitizing effects; teratogenic and mutagenic effects; and effects on the 
reproductive system. 49 From a lawyer's point of view, the prerequi-
sites are similar to EEC Directive 67 /548. 
The FAQ Code refers to the WHO recommended classification of 
pesticides by hazards as the starting point for labeling and packaging 
requirements. so Classification in the WHO-recommended scheme dif-
fers from the EC Directive 78/631 51 in that the WHO scheme distin-
guishes four categories of hazards: extremely hazardous, highly 
hazardous, moderately hazardous, and slightly hazardous. 
2. Labeling and Packaging 
At the EC level, the marketing of classified chemicals, pesticides, 
and preparations is tied to labeling and packaging requirements. 
Although the labeling and packaging requirements ditf er according to 
the category of products concerned, the basic concept derives from 
Directive 67 /548. 
Packaging must satisfy the following requirements: 
(a) it shall be so designed and constructed that its contents cannot es-
cape; this requirement shall not apply where special safety devices are 
prescribed; 
(b) the materials constituting the packaging and fastening must not be 
susceptible to adverse attack by the contents, or liable to form harmful 
or dangerous compounds with the contents; 
(c) packaging and fastenings must be strong and solid throughout to en~ 
sure that they will not loosen and will safely meet the normal stresses 
and strains of handling; 
(d) containers fitted with replaceable fastening devices shall be so 
designed that the packaging can be repeatedly refastened without the 
contents escaping. 52 
Member States are allowed to go beyond that mandatory level and 
to prescribe additional requirements: that packages shall initially be 
closed with a seal so that when the package is opened for the first time, 
the seal is irreparably damaged; that containers with a capacity not 
exceeding three liters that contain dangerous substances intended for 
domestic use shall have childwresistant fastenings; and that containers 
with a capacity not exceeding one liter that contain very toxic, toxic, 
or corrosive liquids intended for domestic use shall carry a tactile 
warning of <langer. The options for packaging rules on child-resistant 
49. ILO, Recommendation Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemica/s at Work, 73 ÜFFICIAL 
BULL. 84, art. 6, at 85 (1990) [hereinafter ILO Recommendation]. 
50. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 10(2)(3). 
51. Council Directive 78/631, supra note 45, art. 3, at 14-15. 
52. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 15, at 16. 
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fastenings and tactile wamings have been subject to controversial de-
bate throughout the Community. Here, the Member States' packaging 
rules di1fer considerably. 53 
The packaging rules are supplemented by labeling rules. Accord-
ing to Directive 67 /5481 Member States have to ensure that dangerous 
substances cannot be placed on the market unless the labeling on their 
packages satisfies the following requirements: 
Every package shall show clearly and indelibly the following: 
- the name of the substance, 
- the origin of the substance, 
- the <langer symbol, when laid down, and indication of danger in-
volved in the use of the substance, 
- standard phrases indicating the special risks arising from such 
dangers, 
- standard phrases indicating the safety advice relating to the use of 
the substance. 54 
These factors are spelled out in the directive in some detail. Harmoni-
zation is nearly total. While some derogations are allowed, the Mem-
ber States are obliged to inform the Commission of them. The 
directives on pesticides and on dangerous preparations, 78/631 55 and 
88/37956 respectively, supplement the above mentioned prerequisites 
by providing further product-related labeling requirements. lt is hard 
to distinguish the different packaging and labeling rules on dangerous 
substances, pesticides, and preparations. Even the Community seems 
tobe somewhat confused. In its latest directive on dangerous prepara-
tions, 88/379, it indicated that the rules should be reviewed to dis-
cover where they differ and where loopholes need to be closed. 57 
From an international perspective, it is important that the labeling and 
packaging rules in the Community have been totally harmonized. 
Products classified, labeled, and packaged according to these three di-
rectives58 can be marketed throughout the Community. There is, 
however, one exception. When products do not fall within the scope 
of the three directives, considerable differences between national provi-
sions remain. 
At the international level, packaging and labeling rules on pesti-
cides and chemicals are mentioned in the GA TI Agreement on Tech-
53. Rehbinder, supra note 20. 
54. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 16(2), at 16. 
55. Council Directive 78/631, supra note 45, arts. 6 & 7, at 16-17. 
56. Council Directive 88/379, supra note 46, arts. 7 & 8, at 23-25. 
57. Id. pmbl., at 15. 
58. Council Directive 88/379, supra note 46; Sixth Amendment, supra note 21; Council Di-
rective 781631, supra note 45. 
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nical Barriers to Trade. 59 In its preamble, the Agreement urges the 
parties to ensure that both technical regulations and standards (includ-
ing requirements for packaging, marking, and labeling) and methods 
for certifying conformity with technical regulations and standards do 
not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. The Agree-
ment, however, does not lay down minimum requirements in any form 
as to the labeling and packaging of chemicals and pesticides as such. 
lt tries to eliminate possible technical barriers to trade resulting from 
deviating labeling and packaging standards. 
Quite specifi.c rules on the labeling of chemicals and pesticides can 
be found in the Convention on Safety in the Use of Chemicals at 
W ork. 60 The primary addressee of the "labeling and marking require-
ments" in the Convention is the employee, but the Convention applies 
to all branches of economic activity in which chemicals are used in 
enterprises, including production, handling, storage, transport, and 
disposal. 61 
Article 7 of the Convention requires signatory States to ensure that 
hazardous chemicals are labeled so as to provide essential information 
regarding their identity, their classification, the hazards they present, 
and the safety precautions tobe observed. The requirements of what 
should be understood by readers of the label are f ound in the ILO 
Recommendations.62 Specifically, labeling requirements should cover, 
in conformity with existing national or international systems: 
(a) the information tobe given on the label including as appropriate: 
(i) trade names; 
(ii) identity of the chemical; 
(iii) name, address and telephone number of the supplier; 
(iv) hazard symbols; 
(v) nature of the special risks associated with the use of the chemi-
cal; 
(vi) safety precautions; 
(vii) identification of the batch; 
(viii) the statement that a chemical safety data sheet giving addi-
tional information is available from the employer; 
(ix) the classification assigned under a system established by the 
competent authority; 
(b) the legibility, durability and size of the label; 
(c) the uniformity of labels and symbols, including colours.63 
59. GATT, AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL ßARRlERS TO TRADE pmbl. (1979) (currently 
under revision in the Uruguay Round). 
60. ILO Convention, supra note S, art. 7, at 74; see also ILO Recommendation, supra note 49, 
art. 8, at 86. 
61. ILO Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2 & 7, at 73-74. 
62. Id. art. 7, at 74; ILO Recommendation, supra note 49, art. 8, at 86. 
63. ILO Recommendation, supra note 49, art. 8(2), at 86. 
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Criteria for the preparation of chemical safety data and informa-
tion sheets shall be established by the competent authorities, and then 
the sheets shall be provided to employers. 64 There is no link, however, 
between the classification of a substance and its labeling and packaging 
with a view to marketing. Information on the dangerous aspects of 
chemicals and pesticides could be improved indirectly here, but the 
Convention is not aimed at regulating the trade in or the production of 
chemicals and pesticides. 
The F AO Code of Conduct institutes industrial and governmental 
responsibilities for labeling and packaging for chemical safety, espe-
cially pesticides. 65 Pesticide containers should be clearly labeled in ac-
cordance with applicable international guidelines such as the F AO 
Guidelines on Good Labeling Practices.66 Article 10 of the FAQ 
Code then requires industry: 
- to use labels that include recommendations consistent with those of 
the recognized research and advisory agencies in the country of sale; 
- to include appropriate symbols and pictographs whenever possible in 
addition to written instructions, warnings and precautions; 
- to use labels that in international trade clearly show appropriate 
WHO hazard classification of the contents or, if this is inappropriate 
or inconsistent with the national regulations, use the relevant 
classification; 
- to include in the appropriate language or languages, a warning 
against the reuse of containers and instructions for the safe disposal 
or decontamination of empty containers; 
- to identify each lot or batch of product in numbers or letters that can 
be read, transcribed or communicated by anyone, without the need 
for codes or other means or deciphering; 
- to use labels that are marked with the date, month and year of for-
mulation of the lot or batch and with the relevant information on the 
storage stability of the product. 67 
Article 10(3) refers to the packaging, storage, and disposal of pesti-
cides which should be in conformity with the principles laid down in 
the F AO Guidelines for the Packaging and Storage of Pesticides, 68 the 
FAO Guidelines on the Disposal of Surplus Pesticides and Pesticides 
Containers,69 and the WHO Specifications for Pesticides used in Pub-
64. lLO Convention, supra note 5, art. 8, at 74. 
65. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 10. 
66. F AO, GUIDELINES ON Gooo LABELLJNG PRACTICE OF PESTICIDES, F AO Doc. COA6/ 
85/9 (1985); F AO, PICTOGRAMS FOR PESTICIDE LABELS. 
67. FAQ Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 10(2). 
68. FAQ, GUIDELINES FOR THE PACKAGJNG AND STORAGE OF PESTICJDES (1985). 
69. FAQ, GUlDEUNES ON THE ÜISPOSAL OF SURPLUS PESTJCIDES AND PESTICIDE.S CON· 
TAJNERS (1985). 
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lic Health.7° Finally, governments are invited to take the necessary 
regulatory measures to prohibit the repacking, decanting, or dispens-
ing of any pesticide into food or beverage containers and to enforce 
rigidly punitive measures that effectively deter such practices.71 
The FAO labeling and packaging rules for pesticides, although not 
mandatory, are approaching the status of the national and regional 
rules. They provide a minimum standard in labeling and packaging, a 
minimum standard that has not yet been acbieved in the field of chem-
ical substances and preparations. 
3. Advertising 
Even modern chemical laws do not provide for mandatory adver-
tising rules. This omission is due to the fact that chemical laws, in 
principle, are restricted to industrially manufactured chemicals; they 
exclude preparations dedicated to end-users. This is not the case when 
chemicals like preparations or pesticides are sold in a manufactured 
form to end-users. Here, advertising rules might be important to the 
user. This is particularly true for pesticides, where there have been 
reports of unfair practices, mainly from Third World countries.72 In-
dustrialized countries have not developed specific rules for pesticide 
advertising. Pesticide advertising is usually subject to rules and regu-
lations concerning unfair marketing practices. The point of reference 
is not a specific category or product but the market transaction. 
Equivalent rules do not yet exist on the international level, but the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the United Nations have at-
tempted to establish fair practices codes. 
These eff orts can be seen in the F AO Code of Conduct. Article 11 
provides extensive rules for the regulation of pesticide advertising. 73 
The primary target of article 11 is industry itself, but international 
organizations and public sector groups are invited to call attention to 
departures from this article.74 Under this code, governments are en-
couraged to work with manufacturers to take advantage of the manu-
facturers' marketing skills and infrastructures to provide public service 
70. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATJON, SPECJFICATJONS FOR PESTICmEs UsED IN Pueuc 
HEAL TH (1985). 
71. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 10(4). 
72. See DAVID BULL, A GROWING PROBLEM: PESTICIDES AND THE THIRD WORLD POOR 
92-123 (1982) (illustrations of pesticide advertisements); Foo ÜAIK SIM, THE PESTICJDE 
POISONlNG REPORT 3 (1985); DAVID WEIR & MARK SHAPlRO, ClRCLf.. OF POISON, PESTICIDES 
AND PEOPLE IN A HUNGRY WORLD 40-43 (1981). 
73. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 11. 
74. /d.; see also GRETTA GOLDENMAN & SAROVINI RENGAM, PROBLEM PESTIC!DES, PES-
TICIDE PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1988). 
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advertising regarding the saf e and effective use of pesticides. 75 Such 
advertising could focus on proper equipment use and maintenance, 
Special precautions for children and pregnant women, the danger of 
reusing containers, and the importance of following label directions. 
Although these general rules apply to all kinds of transactions, they 
are shaped by the needs of the trade between pesticide-producing 
States and Third World importing States. 
C. Premarket Control of Chemicals and Pesticides 
The Sixth Amendment applies only to newly marketed products. 76 
The U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), to the contrary, ex-
plicitly controls both old and new chemicals. 77 Pesticide control regu-
lations sutfer from the same defect. These regulations require 
statutory review of all new products but do not provide similar scru-
tiny f or products already on the market. 78 
1. Spectrum of Preventive Control Measures 
There are three types of preventive control:79 prior approval pro-
cedures, notification procedures, and regulatory mechanisms in which 
the primary responsibility rests with the manufacturer. The last cate-
gory assumes there are no other statutory regulations of chemicals and 
pesticides and that the manufacturer alone can decide what will be 
manufactured and how it will be sold. 
Most of the industrialized countries have introduced either prior 
approval procedures or notification procedures, but there are still a 
considerable number of developing countries without premarket con-
trol of chemicals and pesticides. 80 Notification procedures can be un~ 
75. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 11(3). 
76. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, pmbl., at 10. 
77. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(b)(l)(C), 2604(a) (1988) [hereinaf-
ter TSCA]. 
78. Fora comparative analysis of the EC Sixth Amendment and the U.S. TSCA, see George 
B. Wilkinson, The Sixth Amendment: Taxie Substanee Contra/ in the EEC, 12 LAW & PoL'Y 
INT'L Bus. 461, 486-97 (1980); see also Robert A. Wyman, Jr., Control of Toxie Substanees: The 
Attempt to Harmonize the Notification Requirements of the U.S Taxie Substances Control Aet 
and the European Community Sixth Amendment, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 417 (1980). AJtbough 
somewhat outdated these two articles provide a valuable analysis of both regulatory schemes. 
See generally International Regulation of Taxie Substances (panel discussion), 73 PROC. AM. 
Soc'Y INT'L L. 76 (1979) [here.inafter International Regulation of Toxie Substances]. Fora more 
recent perspective, See RONALD BRICKMAN ET AL, CONTROLLING CHEMJCALS ( 1985). 
79. See REHBINDER, supra note 14, at 5. 
80. Review of Environmental Activilies Related to the Production and Use of Chernicals, 
UNEP Informal Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the Amended London Guide-
lines, UNEP/PIC. CONS. 1/4 (1990); for a comparative analysis, see also REVUE JURIDIQUE 
DE L'ENVlRONMENT, LES PESTIClDES EN DROIT COMPAR~ (1987). 
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derstood as a mechanism of shared responsibility. The manufacturer 
has to notify a competent authority of its intention to manufacture or 
market a new chemical. The authority then takes the necessary steps 
to ensure that the chemicals are adequately tested, classified, labeled, 
and packaged. The procedure is different in countries where chemi-
cals and pesticides are subject to a prior approval procedure. In those 
States, the competent authorities must actually approve a chemical or 
pesticide before it can be manufactured and marketed. 
2. Chemicals 
Japan uses a substance-related licensing procedure. 81 lt consists 
both of a screening mechanism designed to assess the risks associated 
with a particular substance and of a subsequent procedure of formal 
control. lt determines whether the substance belongs to the category 
of "specified chemical substances." That category consists of sub-
stances that are persistent, tend to accumulate in living organisms, and 
ha ve toxic properties. 82 The majority of chemical licensing schemes in 
other States have a much more limited scope and purpose. Germany, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland each have introduced a 
licensing procedure to control the manufacture, sale, and/or use of 
particularly hazardous substances. New Zealand only regulates the 
sale of these substances. These procedures do not create general, sub-
stance-related chemical controls. 83 
The licensing procedures in the Netherlands and the United King-
dom have a broader purpose. Those procedures would allow the in-
troduction of substance-related control. Under the Dutch chemical 
regulation, a competent agency is authorized to deny a permit where 
necessary to protect humans and the environment. 84 lt has been dis-
puted whether the Sixth Amendment provides the opportunity to in-
troduce such a licensing scheme. With respect to manufacture and 
use, Member States are not bound by the directive as long as their 
procedures are not seen as disguised attempts to control the marketing 
of substances already notified under the directive and thus freely avail-
able for sale in the EC. A Iicensing procedure that protects against 
specific risks of manufacture or use seems permissible. 85 
81. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note l, at 15; UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, 
supra note !, at 18. 
82. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 15; UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, 
supra note 1, at 18. 
83. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note l, at 17. 
84. Id. (the Netherlands draft subsequently became law); see also Rehbinder, supra note 20. 
85. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note l, at 17. 
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Chemical licensing procedures are not common in the industrial-
ized countries. The broadest attempt to introduce premarket control 
of chemicals is based on the idea that notification suffices to protect 
humans and the environment. This is particularly true for the Mem-
ber States of the EC, and also for the EFTA countries and the United 
States. The EC Member States have implemented the Sixth Amend-
ment differently. This could significantly impact European integra-
tion. 86 From an international perspective, however, it is much more 
important to stress the relative harmony among most industrialized 
countries with respect to the necessary limitation of premarket notifi-
cation procedures. 
The history of the international harmonization of chernical regula-
tion illuminates the incentives for the development of an international 
model of chemicals control. Since the early l 970s, a nurnber of indus-
trialized countries have discussed the necessity of adopting chemical 
regulations. France set the European legislative machinery into mo-
tion by notifying the Community of its intentions to adopt chemical 
legislation.87 Across the Atlantic, the United States was already in the 
process of preparing specific chemical-related legislation. 88 These ini-
tiatives were pooled by the OECD. The OECD and the European 
Community, both international organizations grouping highly indus-
trialized countries, initiated an intensive period of cooperation to guar-
antee a harmonized approach to regulation among their members to 
prevent the emergence of new, technical trade barriers. These OECD 
and EC initiatives were quite successful. There is no evidence that the 
remaining disparities between EC and U.S. chemical control regula· 
tions have led to international trade problems. 
Despite the similarities among the legislative efforts of industrial-
ized countries to control chemicals, those similarities do not override a 
number of important differences.89 In the United States, manufactur-
ers have to notify the competent agencies before manufacturing a new 
chemical. 90 Under the Sixth Amendment, notification is only neces-
sary before marketing a new chemical. 91 This difference is important 
in deciding the extent to which Member States are allowed to intro-
duce licensing procedures related to the manufacture and use of spe-
cific highly dangerous chemical substances. The difference hetween 
86. See Rehbinder, supra note 20. 
87. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 4 71. 
88. Id. at 473, 486. 
89. See id. at 486; Wyman, supra note 78, at 442-43. 
90. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1988). 
91. Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 6(1), at 13. 
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premanufacturing and premarketing notification is even more impor-
tan t for determining under which conditions chemicals that have not 
been notified to the authorities might be exported to countries outside 
either the European Community or the United States. Premanufac-
turing notification excludes such an opportunity. Premarketing notifi-
cation allows manufacturers to produce chemicals without notifying 
the competent authorities if they are able to demonstrate that these 
chemicals have been produced for export only. 
Other difficulties in the negotiations between the OECD and the 
EC resulted from the differences in the notice procedures of the United 
States and the EC.92 Section 5 of the TSCA requires premanufactur-
ing notice and testing for new substances and substances that are sub-
ject to significant "new uses. "93 The Sixth Amendment requires 
elaborate notification documents, including testing results. 94 Unlike 
TSCA section 5, which confers no competence on the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EP A) to compel manufacturers to conduct test-
ing, the Sixth Amendment establisbes a mandatory testing scheme for 
all new chemicals. 95 In the European Community, responsibility rests 
upon the manufacturer to judge the possible risk of the notified chemi-
cal; in the United States, responsibility lies with the EPA to review the 
notice and request additional information necessary for risk assess-
ment. 96 The differences between mandatory testing combined with the 
manufacturers' responsibility to assess the results as opposed to mere 
paper notice in conjunction with a statutory risk assessment had led to 
a situation where testing disparities became a crucial area of concem 
in the dialogue between the OECD and the EC. 
The Sixth Amendment advocated a unique mandatory test screen-
ing, valid for all types of chemicals. The U.S. approach focused on the 
possible toxicity of the product. 97 The differences in the test philoso-
phy reflect the differences in risk assessment. The EC has a quantity-
triggering mechanism that subjects chemicals to a basic test supple-
mented by additional testing if more than a certain quantity is pro-
duced. The U.S. risk assessment procedure was less rigid and less 
predictable because it focused on the toxicity of the chemical sub-
92. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 489; Wyman, supra note 78, at 442-57. 
93. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1988). 
94. S1xth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 6(1), at 13. 
95. Compare TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) {1988) with Sixth Amendment, supra note 21, art. 
6, at 13; see also Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 489. 
96. Compare Sixth Amendment, supra note 21. art. 6(1), at 13 with TSCA 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2603(a), 2604(b) (1988); see also Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 495-97. 
97. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 491-92. 
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stances alone. 98 
Here the OECD stepped in and tried to develop a common testing 
framework. Two recommendations, the Guidelines for Testing of 
Chemicals99 and the Good Laboratory Practice in the Testing of 
Chemicals, 100 both adopted in 1982, have been of considerable impor-
tance in bringing together the different approaches. The Guidelines 
for Testing of Chemicals establishes a minimum set of tests, making 
European mandatory testing compatible with U.S. optional testing in 
the case of presumed toxicity. 
The EP A used the OECD as an international forum to push the 
development of minimum testing requirements, although it had no 
competence under TSCA to adopt such minimum mandatory stan-
dards for testing.101 U.S. manufacturers, contemplating the need to 
defend themselves in future lawsuits under the TSCA, wanted a clear 
administrative record for TSCA regulations. Therefore, the EP A 
acted cautiously in its negotiations with the EC and kept careful 
records of all meetings. 102 European manufacturers, on the other 
band, bad to accept common Guidelines on Good Laboratory Practice 
in the Testing of Chemicals. In their national legislation most of the 
EC Member States refer, in one form or another, to the OECD Guide-
lines.103 The Guidelines are not directly integrated into the laws and 
are not mandatory in strictly legal terms, but they play a major role in 
present practice. 
No equivalent premarket control legislation exists on the interna-
tional floor. The Ad Hoc Meeting of Senior Government Official Ex-
perts in Environmental Law, Montevideo 1982, adopted a program for 
the development and periodic review of environmental law. 104 lt con-
cluded that international trade in potentially harmful chemicals calls 
for action, but this mandate has not yet been realized. 
3. Pesticides 
By authority of either special pesticide laws or general chemical 
98. ld. 
99. OECD, GVIDELINES FOR TESTJNG OF CHEMJCALS (1982). 
100. OECD, Gooo LABORATORY PRACTICE IN THE TESTING OF CHEMICALS (1982). 
101. Fora detailed presentation of the OECD policy, see remarks of M.C. Bracken in Inter-
national Regulation o/ Taxie Suhstances (panel discussion), supra note 78, at 88; see also BRJCK-
MAN, supra note 78, at 298 (discussing the EPA's role in OECD negotiations). 
102. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 489-90. 
103. Rehbinder, supra note 20. 
104. Montevideo Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental 
Law, Ad Hoc Meeting of Senior Government Officials Ex.perl in Environmental Law, Monte-
video, 6 November 1981; UNEP Governing CounciJ, Decision 10/21 (May 31, 1982). 
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laws, most industrialized countries require that a pesticide be regis-
tered prior to market entry. 105 The registration procedure is essen-
tially a substance-related licensing procedure. Many countries, 
including Denmark, France, Germany, and Switzerland, call it a 
"prior approval procedure," thereby underscoring that pesticides can 
be marketed only if the competent authority has positively approved 
their safety .106 The same type of prior approval procedure is com-
monly used for medicines. 107 Therefore, one who intends to manufac-
ture and market a new pesticide must perform a series of tests and 
present the results to the appropriate competent agencies. The manu-
facturer must also initiate, if necessary, additional testing and decide 
whether, under what conditions, and for what purpose the pesticide 
might be put on the market. 108 
The normal prerequisites for pesticide approval are sufficient effec-
tiveness, suitability, and safety for humans, animals, and the environ-
ment (Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States). 109 The integration of environ-
mental protection into the licensing procedure is relatively new, and 
the main objective is still to protect humans rather than the environ-
ment. Countries tend to use a two-pronged approach, ranking the 
protection of the environment behind human health and safety. Some-
times there are additional prerequisites related to the producer or to 
methods of production. In the U nited Kingdom, the same kind of 
assessment is marle under a voluntary joint industry-government certi-
fication scheme, the Pesticide Safety Precautions Scheme. 110 This vol-
untary arrangement preceded the 1968 introduction of prior approval 
procedures in the former Federal Republic of Germany. In 1986, 
however, the United Kingdom joined the majority of the industrial-
ized countries and inserted a prior approval procedure in its pesticide 
legislation. 
At the European level, premarket control of pesticides has never 
reached the same degree of public and political attention as premarket 
105. UNEP CoMPARATIVE SuRVEY, supra note l, at 18. Fora comparative analysis, see 
KLAUS BosSELMANN, RECHT DER GEFAHRSTOFFE: RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER ÜBERBLICK 
(1987); Charlotte Uram, International Regulation of the Safe and Use of Pesticides, 10 Nw. J. 
INT'L L. & Bus. 460, 463, 467 (1990); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
106. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 18. 
107. Fora recent analysis of medicine regulation in the European context, see D. HART & N. 
REICH, INTEGRATION UND RECHT DES ARZNEIMITTELMARKETS IN DER EG (ZERP 
Schriftenreihe, Band l3, 1990); for an analysis of the situation in a third world country, see G. 
MATUSCH, ORUG SAFETY IN KEN\'A (ZERP-Dicussion Paper, Band 6, 1991). 
108. See UNEP COMPARATIVE SuRVEY, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
109. Jd. at 18. 
110. Id. 
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·control of chemicals. In 1976 the Commission of the European Com-
munity presented a proposal for the establishment of a European prior 
approval procedure. 111 The draft was meant to supplement Directive 
78/631 112 on the classification, labeling, and packaging of pesticides, 
but it was not supported by the Council. The White Paper on the 
Completion of the Internal Market by 1992 gave a new impetus to the 
harmonization of premarket control in the European Community .113 
In 1991 the Commission adopted a new, completely revised sys-
tem. 114 lt provides for a two-tier control that distinguishes between 
the registration of active substances and the prior approval of prepara-
tions.115 Prior approval of preparations (pesticides) should be left to 
the Member States. The Member States, however, can approve only 
those preparations whose active substances appear in annex I. 116 Arti-
c1e 5 states that an active substance shall be included in annex I for an 
initial period not exceeding ten years only if 
(a) their residues, consequent on application consistent with good plant 
protection practice, do not have any harmful effects on human or animal 
health or on groundwater or any unacceptable influence on the environ-
ment, and the said residues, in so far as they are of toxicological or envi-
ronmental significance, can be measured by methods in general use; 
(b) their use, consequent on application consistent with good plant pro-
tection practice, does not have any harmful effects on human or animal 
health or any anacceptable [sie] influence on the environment as pro-
vided for in Article 4(1 )(b )(iv) and ( v ). 111 
The directive does not currently contain a list of active substances. 
lt should be compiled later by the Standing Committee on Plant 
Health. Prior approval of preparations by the Member States requires 
both a listing of the active substances at the Community level and all 
of the following: 
(b) it is established, in the light of current scientific and technical kowl-
edge [sie] and shown from appraisal of the dossier provided for in Annex 
III, that when used in accordance with Article 3(3), and having regard 
to all normal conditions under which it may be used, and to the conse-
quences of its use: 
(i) it is sufficiently effective; 
(ii) it has no unacceptable effect on plants or plant products; 
I 11. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Placing of EEC-accepted 
Plant Protection Products on the Market, art. 3, 1976 O.J. (C 212) 3, 5. 
112. Council Directive 78/631, supra note 45. 
113. Completing the Internat Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, COM(85)310 final. 
114. Council Directive 91/414, supra note 24. 
115. ld. arts. 3, 4, at 4-5. 
116. ld. art. 4(1)(a), at 4. 
117. ld. art. 5(1), at 6. 
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(iii) it does not cause unnecessary suff'ering and pain to vertebrates 
to be controlled; 
(iv) it has no harmful effect on human or animal health, directly or 
indirectly (e.g. through drinking water, food or feed) or on 
groundwater; 
(v) it has no unacceptable inftuence on the environment, having 
particular regard to the following considerations: 
- its fate and distribution in the environment, particularly con-
tamination of water including drinking water and 
groundwater, 
- its impact on non-target species; 
(c) the nature and quantity of its active substances and, where appropri-
ate, any toxicologically or ecotoxicologically significant impurities and 
co-formulants can be determined by appropriate methods, harmonized 
according to the procedure in Article 21, or, if not, agreed by the author-
ities responsible for the authorization; 
(d) its residues, resulting from authorized uses, and which are of toxico-
logical or environmental significance, can be determined by appropriate 
methods in general use; 
(e) its physical and chemical properties have been determined and 
deemed acceptable for purposes of the appropriate use and storage of the 
product. 118 
Once a pesticide is registered by a Member State, all the other 
States would have to allow it to be marketed. A harmonized Commu-
nity procedure for national registration is lacking. Again, a future def-
inition of this procedure is left to the Standing Committee of Plant 
Health. 
The draft of the above directive was much criticized by Member 
States with higher levels of protection, as well as by environmental 
acti vists. 119 lt was said to promote the free ftow of pesticides and to 
ignore the necessity of effective environmental protection.120 The pre-
requisites for authorizing preparations and for listing active substances 
require that there be no "unacceptable inftuence on the environ-
ment."121 These standards have been accused of falling behind the 
existing standards of industrialized countries where mere effects on the 
environment, not only "harmful" or "unacceptable" etfects, have tobe 
considered in the risk assessment. 122 Another point of criticism was 
the lack of clear criteria for the listing of the active substances and the 
prior approval of preparations. That task was again left to a Commit-
118. Id. art. 4(l)(a)-(e), at 4-5. 
119. 4 PAN EUROPE NEWSLEITER, Dec. 1989, at 21·27. 
120. Id. 
121. Council Directive 91/414, supra note 24, arts. 4(1)(b)(v) & 5(1)(a), at 4-5, 6. 
122. Eckard Rehbinder, Einfiihrung, in BREMER KOLLOQUIUM ÜBER PFLANZENSCHUTZ, 
supra note 11, at 3. 
676 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 13:653 
tee without any parliamentary or public control. Annexes II and III 
of the current directive attempt to remedy this problem.123 If a Mem-
ber State has authorized a plant protection product, other Member 
States cannot prevent the production, storage, and movement of that 
product. However, Council Directive 91/ 414 allows Member States 
to prevent the marketing and use of products that they have not au-
thorized. Pesticides already banned in some Member States cannot 
return to the markets of those States. 124 The extensive involvement of 
F AO in developing common registration standards might contribute 
to harmonizing the registration procedure in the European 
Community. 
Under the heading "Reducing Health Hazards," article 5 of the 
FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides re-
quires governments that have not yet done so to "implement a pesti-
cide registration and control scheme."125 Article 6 states: 
Governments should take action to introduce the necessary legislation 
for the regulation, incJuding registration, of pesticides, and make provi-
sions for its etfective enforcement, including the establishment of appro-
priate educational advisory, extension and health-care services. The 
Guidelines for the registration and control of pesticides should be fol-
lowed as far as possible, taking full account of local needs, social and 
economic conditions, levels of literacy, climatic conditions and the avail-
ability of pesticide application equipment. 126 
The F AO Code formulates the background conditions of 
premarket control rather than the procedure itself. The latter is 
spelled out in the FAO Guidelines on the Registration and Control of 
Pesticides. 127 The Code itself grants autonomy to States to decide on 
the cri teria for admitting pesticides to their markets. Reference is 
made to diff erences in climate, diff erences in economic resources, and, 
implicitly, differences in the possibility of securing the safety of those 
who apply the pesticides.12s 
The Guidelines for the Registration and Control of Pesticides is 
designed to be a model registration procedure. This scheme turned 
out to be too sophisticated for countries lacking the necessary infra-
123. CounciJ Directive 91/414, supra note 24, annexes 11-lll, at 15-32. 
124. Id. art. 3, at 4. 
125. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, art. 5. 
126. ld. art. 6. 
127. FAO, GUIDELINES FOR THE REGISTRATION AND CONTROL OF PESTICIDES (INCLUD-
JNG A MODEL SCHEME FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL ÜRGANIZATIONS) (1985); 
FAO, ADDENDA TO THE GVIDELINES FOR THE REGJSTRATJON AND CONTJWL Ol' PESTJCIDES 
(1988). 
128. The Code has been blarned for not adequately addressing the problem of industry 
double standards. GOLDENMAN & RENGAM, supra note 74, at 20-22. 
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structure. Therefore, FAO is preparing Guidelines on the Initial ln-
troduction of a Simple National Pesticide Registration and Control 
Scheme. Testing requirements are stated in the Guidelines on Envi-
ronmental Criteria for the Registration of Pesticides, 129 presently 
under revision. The Guidelines on Good Laboratory Practices define 
minimum testing standards. 130 There are ten other guidelines already 
published, under revision, or under consideration leading to the con-
clusion that the FAO fulfills the same role in the development of com-
mon testing rules for international trade in pesticides as the OECD 
does in the international regulation of chemicals. Industrialized coun-
tries have pooled their interests in chemical regulation within the 
OECD, a forum to which Third World countries have no access. 
FAO is open to all States. Developing countries may bring their influ-
ence to bear, but FAO is primarily an organization dealing with food 
and agriculture and not with health, safety, or environmental protec-
tion. In the 1970s, however, it seriously began to consider these objec-
tives. This might explain why the F AO is seen as the appropriate 
forum for international coordination and cooperation. 
D. Postmarket Control of "Old" Substances and "Old" Pesticides 
Postmarket control mechanisms cover two different areas of con-
cern. First, regulatory mechanisms have to be found for the handling 
of risks from chemicals and pesticides brought into circulation bef ore 
premarket control legislation was adopted. Second, measures are 
needed to withdraw from the market, or even to ban the production 
of, products that legally entered circulation under previous premarket 
control mechanisms but that later turned out tobe dangerous. Cur-
rently, when there is no common denominator on premarket control 
mechanisms of pesticides and chemicals in sight, it might sound 
strange to emphasize postmarket control mechanisms at the interna-
tional level. Public attention, however, is increasingly focused on 
chemicals and pesticides that are legally manufactured and marketed 
all over the world, but that nevertheless constitute risks. The lesson to 
be learned is that premarket controls cannot guarantee that long-term 
hazards will not emerge. 
1. Concept of Postmarket Control 
Postmarket control of old chemicals and old pesticides uses a 
129. FAO, GUIDELINES ON ENVIRONMEN'tAL CRITERIA FOR THE REGlSTRATION OF PES-
TlCIDES ( 1985). 
130. FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 7, at 37 n.4 (explicitly referring to the OECD Guide-
lines prepared for the testing of chemicals but then expanded to pesticides). 
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three-step procedure. A competent regulatory authority must first 
make safety an acceptable reason for engaging in postmarket control. 
It then has to investigate the dangers arising from the questioned 
chemicals and pesticides. Finally, it must decide what action to take. 
Although regulations in distinguishing more and more sophisticated 
degrees of danger often create more problems than they pretend to 
solve, there seems tobe a commonly accepted difference in premarket 
and postmarket control of chemicals and pesticides. Premarket con-
trol relates to potential hazards; postmarket control relates to sus-
pected and known risks. 131 Defining the risk is the starting point for 
investigating the danger. Regulatory bodies can only take postmarket 
control action if they get the necessary information on risks to hurnans 
and the environment. Once the inforrnation is available, the authori-
ties enter the decision-making process. Modern chemical and pesti-
cide laws provide several regulatory instruments to fight possible 
dangers. 132 
Although postmarket control in industrialized countries is a rela-
tively new regulatory field, some common trends are already clear. 
There is a tendency to confer responsibility for postmarket control 
mechanisms on the statutorily competent authorities that are already 
responsible for premarket control. These authorities have thereby 
gained substantial power. They benefit from the uncertainties in defin-
ing risks, from comprehensive mandates in investigating dangers, and 
from discretion in taking the appropriate measures. 133 
This tendency might be somewhat counterbalanced by splitting 
competencies. Industrialized countries tend to establish separate au-
thorities for each category of products - one agency for chemicals, 
another for pesticides. When competence for multiple products is 
brought under the same umbrella organization, separate divisions on 
chemicals and pesticides are usually set up, as in the case of the EP A. 
There is an important difference in the regulatory philosophies of 
European and U.S. authorities. lt has been noted that 
although U.S. and European govemments have addressed the problem of 
chemical control at roughly the same times and have assumed similar 
responsibilities, they have developed markedly different procedures for 
reaching regulatory decisions. Two distinct patterns emerge. American 
regulatory processes stand apart in the complexity of their procedures, 
the heavy reliance on formal analysis of risks and benefits, the openness 
of administrative decision making, and the active supervision of execu-
tive agencies by Congress and the courts. European processes, despite 
131. OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 9-14. 
132. Jd. tbl. 4, at 21. 
133. Majone, supra note 40, at 97-98. 
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some notable ditferences among them, share simpler administrative pro-
cedures, greater informality in the analysis of evidence, less complete 
public access to decision makers, and relatively little oversight by parlia-
ment or the courts. Y et one of our most intriguing conclusions is that 
these contrasting methods of decision making have led to remarkably 
similar policy choices, particularly in the selection of specific chemicals 
as targets of regulation.134 
Access to infonnation plays a key role in postmarket control. The 
1980s demonstrated the growing power of national and international 
nongovernmental organizations to bring the risks of chemicals and 
pesticides to the public's attention and to push regulatory agencies 
into action. Effective postmarket control requires the early public dis-
semination of information on even potential risks of chemicals and 
pesticides. Access to information, however, has tobe weighed against 
the legitimate intellectual property interests of manufacturers in pro-
tecting data on chemicals and pesticides. The industrialized countries 
have not yet arrived at a common solution. The TSCA obliges chemi-
cal manufacturers to make publicly available all data about their prod-
ucts related to health, safety, and environmental protection. The Sixth 
Amendment chose a much more restrictive approach. Data are not 
made available to the public because manufacturers may require confi-
dentiality.135 The OECD has tried to harmonize differences between 
the United States and the European Community. Two guidelines on 
the confidentiality of data protection have been developed. The extent 
to which European and U.S. manufacturers have harmonized their 
differences has never been investigated. As far as is currently known, 
problems have not arisen, but mainly European manufacturers have 
feared the liberal U.S. approach to data protection. Even EC policy 
has changed, as indicated by the newly adopted Directive on Freedom 
of Access to Information. t36 
Whatever solutions are found among the industrialized countries 
to balance the confiicting interests of the public in having early access 
to information about potential hazards of chemicals and pesticides and 
of manufacturers to protect these data, there is much pressure on in-
ternational and nongovernmental organizations, watchdogs of the in-
ternational trade in chemicals and pesticides, to establish their own 
134. BRICKMAN, supra note 78, at 23. 
135. Wilkinson, supra note 78, at 483. For a more comprehensive treatment, see Wyman, 
supra note 78, at 451-52. 
136. Council Directive 90/313 of 7 June 1990 on the Freedom of Access to Information on 
the Environment, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56; GERD WINTER, ÖFFENTLICHKEIT VON UMWEL.T-
INFORMAT!ONEN: EUROPÄISCHE UNO NORDAMERIKANISCHE RECHTE UND ERFAHRUNGEN 
(1990). 
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data collection systems. 137 These systems, however, can never reach 
the same level and quality as the systems erected in the multinational 
enterprises or in the competent authorities of the main chemical- and 
pesticide-producing countries. International information systems that 
do not distinguish between confidential and nonconfidential data on 
potential risks of chemicals and pesticides and that guarantee access to 
inf ormation run the risk of stocking only the "second best'' data. 
2. Information Collection and Information Exchange 
At the national level, high1y sophisticated regulatory systems have 
been developed in the EC, the EFTA countries, and the United States. 
Despite considerable differences in detail, there seems to be an inverse 
relationship between the quality of premarket control and that of 
postmarket control. In other words, in countries with a well-devel-
oped system of premarket control of pesticides, as in Germany, 
postmarket control is less developed. Quite the opposite is true for 
technica1 consumer goods. These goods are usually not subject to any 
kind of statutory premarket control, but highly sophisticated systems 
exist to withdraw unsafe technical consumer goods from the mar-
ket.138 Well developed data collection is based on accident surveil-
lance systems; on the notification duties of manufacturers, suppliers, 
and importers; and on mechanisms to guarantee that informal infor-
mation from individuals or organizations is dealt with appropriately. 
The overall intention of these mechanisms is to guarantee that compe-
tent authorities are brought into a position where they can assess the 
reported risks with respect to the legal requirements. 
At the EC level, a sophisticated system of information collection 
and information exchange is operating only in the area of technical 
consumer goods. Here, the so-called Rapid Exchange System, Coun-
cil Regulation 84/133, requires the reporting of formal and informal 
regulatory actions of Member State authorities to the Commission, 
which guarantees the exchange of information with all the other Mem-
ber States. 139 The Draft Directive on Product Safety 90/C 156/07 
even tries to establish a mechanism under which the Commission itself 
137. Y. Domzalski, Les Interpols des Associations de Consommateurs, BEVC/113/84 (1984). 
138. See CHR1STIAN JoERGES ET AL., DIE SICHERHEIT VON KoNSVMERGÜTERN UND DIE 
ENTWICKLUNG DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN (ZERP Schriftenreihe, Band 2, 1988) 
for a comprehensive analysis of consumer product safety legislation in the European 
Community. 
139. Council Decision 84/113 of 2 March 1984 Introducing a Community System for the 
Rapid Exchange of Information on Dangers Arising from the Use of Consumer Products, 1984 
O.J. (L 70) 16, as amended 1989 0.J. (Ll7) 51, and 1990 O.J. (L 173) 49. Fora critical review, 
see Josef Falke, What Should be the Content of an E. E. C. General Directive on the Safety of 
Technicaf Consumer Goods, BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Nov.·Dec. 1986, at 16. 
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is able to take action at the Community level in emergency 
situations. 140 
There is no EC equivalent for controlling chemicals and pesticides. 
There is no mechanism obliging Member States to exchange informa-
tion with the Commission or with the other Member States on possible 
risks from unsafe chemicals or pesticides. Presently, the consultative 
committees, composed of representatives of Member States and the 
Commission and constituted under the respective directives, guarantee 
that an informal exchange of information can take place. However, 
these committees are working behind closed doors; neither public in-
terest groups nor manufacturers have been officially granted access. 
Also, the committees themselves are under no duty to report on their 
activities.141 
The situation is different when Member States want to prohibit or 
restrict the marketing of chemicals or pesticides that comply with ac-
cepted European standards. Here, the directives provide a safeguard 
procedure under which Member States must notify the Commission of 
their intentions. The Commission, in turn, then initiates a procedure 
to find a common position at the European level. 142 However, there is 
no legal obligation to come to a joint solution. The Community has no 
power to take action if one Member State legitimately prohibits the 
import of certain unsafe chemicals or pesticides for heath, safety, and 
environmental protection reasons. This mechanism, established under 
the Sixth Amendment, is used in Directive 91/414 on pesticides. 143 
Information collection and exchange about possible risks from 
dangerous pesticides and chemicals and about regulatory actions taken 
by States to mitigate these risks constitute two of the predominant 
areas of concem for international organizations. 144 U.N. organiza-
tions concentrate their toxic chemical efforts on the collection, evalua-
tion, and dissemination of information on chemical risks. The 
environmental health criteria program, for example, compiles and 
analyzes the available information on the health effects of a limited 
140. Commission Amended Proposal 90/C 156/07 of 11 June 1990 for a CounciJ Directive 
Concerning General Product Safety, arts. 8-11, 1990 O.J. (C 156) 8, 12-13; see also Josef Falke, 
Elements of a Horizontal Product Safety Policy for the European Community, 12 J. CoNSUMER 
POL'Y 207 (1989); Stephen Weatherill, A General Duty to Supply Only Safe Goods in the Commu-
nity, Some Remarks from a British Perspective, 13 J. CONSUMER PoL'Y 79 (1990). 
141. H. Bentlage, An Advisory Board for Consumer Product Safety: The German Experience 
- European Perspectives, in STUDIE IM AUFTRAG DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 
(ZERP Vertrags-Nummer 6674/89/15, 1990). 
142. The safeguard procedure is not specific to a particular directive. lt is a widely spread 
mechanism to cope with differing regulatory actions of Member States to fight unsafe products. 
143. Council Directive 91/414, supra note 24, art. 11, at 9. 
144. See BRICKMAN, supra note 78, at 291. 
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. number of selected pollutants. These evaluations are published in a 
series of reports, some of which even conclude with regulatory recom-
mendations. WHO has established a similar program on work place 
hazards. 145 
Several U .N. programs focus more on dissemination of informa-
tion than on evaluation. The International Register of Potentially 
Taxie Chemicals is charged with developing an international data 
bank on toxic chemicals, particularly common agrochemicals. ILO 
publishes bibliographies and an encyclopedia of occupational health 
and safety, both of which contain information on chemical hazards. 
The International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), an effort 
cosponsored by WHO, ILO, and UNEP, has been established to regis-
ter national institutions and support agencies in a coordinated pro-
gram of new research on specific hazards. 
In contrast to the EC, or even the OECD, programs, the efforts of 
the U.N. organizations in the area of toxic substance control seem 
rather fragmented, even duplicative. They try to achieve, however, 
what is undoubtedly .their principal purpose and value: to render ser-
vice to those countries that lack an indigenous capability to compile 
such information and to evaluate the world literature on chemical 
hazards. In fulfilling these functions, the U.N. agencies help extend 
the benefits of scientific information and increased sophistication in 
controlling risks to the less advantaged regions of the world. 146 
After information on toxic chemical risks has been collected, 
mechanisms have to be established to promote collective regulatory 
action. This is where international organizations have become in-
volved and have demonstrated their willingness to play a key role. 
The emergence of information collection and exchange in the field of 
regulatory action restricting or banning chemicals and pesticides is 
closely related to the discussion of international efforts to regulate the 
export and import of severely restricted and banned chemicals and 
pesticides. 147 
The OECD is playing a leading role in the management of risks 
from old chemicals and pesticides that were originally produced and 
marketed lang before mechanisms of premarket control were devel-
oped. The OECD, supported by the main chemical-producing coun-
tries, is trying to develop a program for dealing with old chemicals and 
145. Fora comparative overview, see OECD, REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON INFOR· 
MATION EXCHANGE RELATED TO EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS (1982). 
146. BRICKMAN, supra note 78, at 291. 
147. See supra Part Il(E). 
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pesticides. 148 Currently, there is no common methodology for select-
ing old substances. Different criteria, resulting from the divergent ex-
periences of the key authorities of the various States, are under 
discussion. For instance, the German Federal Environmental Agency, 
composed of representatives from the chemical industry, govemment 
agencies, and science, advocates a multistep procedure. From the 
original list of 4,554 substances, only sixty remain to be further ex-
amined. The parallel to the late 1970s, when the introduction of 
premarket control mechanisms on chemicals was discussed in Europe 
and in the United States, is striking. Once more, it may be necessary 
to find a common denominator in order to evaluate over 100,000 
chemical substances and to decide which require the highest degree of 
public attention. 149 A recent EC initiative that translates the OECD 
program into EC legislation seems to be a first step in that direction. 150 
3. Rules to Ban or Restrict the Production, Marketing, and Use of 
U nsafe Chemicals and Pesticides 
Deciding to ban or restrict unsafe chemicals and pesticides entails 
a complicated procedure of balancing interests. This procedure takes 
place at the national level. Each State defines the instruments and 
chooses the regulatory form under which the action is taken. In Ger-
many and Japan, partial bans or restrictions of chemicals are accom-
plished by regulation. Most States delegate the authority to ban or 
restrict the marketing and use of unsafe chemicals and pesticides to 
the agency in charge of premarket control. 151 
There are considerable differences in the instruments on which ac-
tion can be based. The OECD Report gives an overview using a set of 
tables that link the trigger mechanism to the selection of control ac-
tion. 152 lt should be noted, however, that most of the industrialized 
countries provide not only for the possibility of restricting or banning 
the marketing of unsaf e chemicals but also f or intervening in the pro-
duction process itself and prohibiting the manufacture of dangerous 
148. James E. Brydon et al., OECD's Work on Investigation of High Production Volume 
Chemica/s, 13 lnt'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 263 (June 13, 1990). 
149. Id. at 263-64. 
150. Commission Proposal 90/C 276/01of5 October 1990 for a Council Regulation (EEC) 
on the Evaluation and the Control of the Environmental Risks of Existing Substances, 1990 O.J. 
(C 276) !; Hans-W. Micklitz, Organisational Structures of Product Safety Regulation, in LA 
SECURITE DES BIENS DE CONSOMMATlON, INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE ET CONSOMMATlON 
SUJSSE (B. Stauder ed.) (describing and analyzing premarket and postmarket regulation in the 
field of product safety) [hereinafter Organisational Structures]. 
151. UNEP COMPARATIVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 15. 
152. See OECD COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, tbls. 2, 3, 4, 5, at 13, 16, 21-22. 
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· chemicals. 153 
EC Member States remain responsible for restricting or banning 
the manufacture, use, and marketing of unsafe chemicals and pesti-
cides. There is not yet an agreement, even with a view toward the 
Interna} Market, regarding postmarket control at the European leveL 
The directives to ban and restrict unsafe chemicals, Directive 76/ 
769, 154 and to regulate unsafe pesticides, Directive 79/117, 155 provide 
a regulatory framework that may be regarded as a starting point for 
European postmarket control management. A ban or restriction, 
however, entails setting the complicated and lengthy agreement proce-
dure of the Community into motion. The Council, the legislative or-
gan, rather than the Commission, the executive organ, must make the 
necessary decision. Agreements are often reached at the lowest com-
mon denominator and resulting measures are adopted only after con-
siderable delay. lt is not surprising that there is little harmony within 
the Community regarding which particular chemicals and pesticides 
are to be restricted or banned. 156 The example of pentachlorophenol 
illustrates the difficulties; the former Federal Republic of Germany de-
cided to ban pentachlorophenol after informing the Commission and 
waiting more than one year for a joint approach. 157 
At the international level, banning or restricting the production, 
use, and marketing of unsafe chemicals and pesticides requires an 
agreement in the competent international organization(s) to either is-
sue a recommendation or develop a binding convention. There are 
only a few examples thus far where a worldwide agreement is being 
considered to regulate unsafe chemicals and pesticides. Reference can 
be made to the OECD recommendation to ban PCB 158 and the most 
recent Montreal Protocol to reduce the production of chemicals that 
deplete the ozone layer. 159 
International organizations have to develop more flexible systems 
to compensate for their lack of regulatory competence. One well-
153. UNEP COMPARATJVE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 15. 
154. Council Directive 76/769 of 27 July 1976 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regula-
tions and Administrative Procedures of the Member States Relating to Restrictions on the Mar-
keting and Use of Certain Dangerous Substances and Preparations, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 201. 
155. Council Directive 79/117 of 21 December 1978 Prohibiting the Placing on the Market 
and Use of Plant Protection Products Containing Certain Active Substances, 1979 O.J. (L 33) 36. 
156. Organisational Structures, supra note 150. 
157. Pentachlorphenalverbotsverordnung, 1989 Bundesgesetzblatt 1 2235. 
158. See OECD Council Decision, Protection of the Environment by Control of 
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (Feb. 13, 1987). For further detaiJs, see OECD, THE OECD CttEMI-
CALS PROGRAMME (1988); Alston, supra note 2, at 423. 
159. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, S. TR.EATY Doc. No. 
10, IOOth Cong„ Ist Sess. (1987). 
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known but highly controversial mechanism to initiate the worldwide 
banning and restricting of unsafe chemicals and pesticides is the adop-
tion of the U.N. Consolidated List, now in its third edition. 160 This 
list compiles information about regulatory actions on chemicals and 
pesticides in order to show, mainly to developing countries, the type of 
actions taken by the industrialized countries to combat unsafe chemi-
cals and pesticides. The Consolidated List is not legally binding, but it 
may have a moral impact in that the products on the list are stigma-
tized and consequently more difficult to market worldwide. The list 
may affect regulatory action in developing countries. lt also may be-
come instrumental for nongovernmental organizations in their fight 
against trade in pesticides and chemicals that pose a well known risk 
to humans and the environment. An example is the Dirty Dozen 
Campaign of the Pesticides Action Network (PAN). 
E. Regulation of the Export and Import of Banned and Severely 
Restricted Chemicals and Pesticides 
There are a number of national and international rules on the ex-
pert and import of banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesti-
cides that merit consideration. From a national perspective, e:fforts by 
the United States, mainly during the late 1970s and early 1980s, to 
regulate the export of pesticides and chemicals must be mentioned. 161 
From a regional perspective, reference should be made to Council 
Regulation 1734/88 concerning the export and import of certain dan-
gerous chemicals. 162 However, national and regional efforts lag be-
hind the overwhelming interest of international organizations in 
advocating harmonized regulation on the expert and import of banned 
l 60. For further analysis, see HANs-W. MICKLITZ, EXPORT OF DANGEROUS 
PHARMACEUTICALS TO TH!RD WORLD COUNTRIES (ZERP-Discussion Papers, 1987). 
16 l. For the leading article on this subject, see Francine Schulberg, United States Export of 
Products Banned for Domestic Use, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331 ( 1979). For an international per-
spective, see Lothar Gündling, Prior Notification and Consultation, in TRANSFERRING HAZARD-
ous TECHNOLOGIES AND SUBSTANCES: THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE 63 (Günther Hand! 
& Robert Lutz eds., 1989); Eckard Rehbinder, Export von Schiidlingsbekiimp/ungsmassnahmen: 
Gemeinsame Verantwortung von Export-und Importstaat?, in JAHRBUCH DES UMWELT- UND 
TECHNIKRECHTS 337 (UTR Band 5, 1988); Marc Pallemaerts, Diplomacy and Double Stan-
dards: The Regulation of International Trade in Pesticides (1985) (unpublished Masters thesis, 
Harvard Law School). 
162. Council Regulation 1734/88 of 16 June 1988 Conceming Export From and Import Into 
the Community of Certain Dangerous Chemicals, 1988 O.J. (L 155) 2. The Commission has 
proposed an amended version of this regulation. The amended version would incorporate a prior 
informed consent procedure. Commission Proposal 9 l/C 17 /20 of 20 December 1990 for a 
Council Regulation Concerning Export and Import of Certain Dangerous Chemi.cals, 1991 O.J. 
(C 17) 16; see also Marc Pallemaerts, Export Notification: The EC Approach in the International 
Context, EUR. ENV'T REV., Feb. 1987, at 25 (discussing the draft proposal for the above-cited 
regulation). 
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and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides. Among the most no-
table efforts are: 
- OECD Recommendation C (84) 37 Information Exchange Related 
to Export of Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals (1984); 
- OECD Guiding Principles on Information Exchange Related to Ex-
port of Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals {1984); 
- UNEP Amended London Guidelines for the Exchange of Informa-
tion on Chemicals in International Trade (1989); 
- F AO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of 
Pesticides (1989); 
- UNEP Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989). 
1. Concept, Definition, and Role of International Organizations 
The export and import of banned and severely restricted chemicals 
and pesticides has become an international issue. The first initiative to 
develop international rules, notably undertaken by the OECD, derived 
from the U.S. policy of the late 1970s and early 1980s to regulate ex-
ports and imports from a human rights perspective. 163 However, na-
tional efforts to control exports and imports have slackened and have 
been replaced by attempts by different international organizations to 
find a harmonized procedure. Tue different regulatory approaches of 
the industrialized nations toward exports of banned and severely re-
stricted chemicals and pesticides are seen as a technical barrier to 
trade requiring an international process of harmonization. The inter-
est in and impact of such an international understanding, however, is 
limited. 
The original plan to harmonize export/import rules worldwide in-
volved merely bridging the gaps between the differences in the various 
national efforts to protect their citizens and the environment against 
risks resulting from pesticides and chemicals. Nevertheless, the differ-
ences that continue even among industrialized nations lead to a situa-
tion in which one industrialized country bans or restricts certain 
pesticides or chemicals while another allows their continued produc-
tion and marketing.164 
The main impetus for an international rule, however, is not the 
differences among industrialized nations. Deve1oping countries, the 
primary recipients of exports of banned and severely restricted chemi-
cals and pesticides, complained in the late l 970s that there was no 
163. See genera/ly M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United 
States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 824-31 (1978); Dana J. Jacob, Comment, Haz-
ardous Exportsfrom a Human Rights Perspective, 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 81 (1983). 
164. See Schulberg, supra note 161, at 331-33. 
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national legislation to protect them from such exports. Theref ore, the 
overall perspective in the early l 980s was not to harmonize the inter-
national rules on the production, use, and marketing of chemicals and 
pesticides. Rather, the goal of the 1970s and 1980s was to find inter-
national rules bridging the gap between the differences among the ex-
tensive chemicals and pesticides regulations of the industrialized 
exporting countries and the lack of comparable rules in the importing 
developing countries. One might even conclude that the original in-
tention was not to regulate the trade of banned and severely restricted 
chemicals and pesticides but to find rules under which trade in these 
incriminated product categories could be legitimated. 
In this period, the OECD played a key role in international efforts 
to resolve export/import issues. In 1984, the OECD adopted its Rec-
ommendation on the Information Exchange Related to Export of 
Banned or Severely Restricted Chemicals165 and the Guiding Princi-
ples.166 For a number of years, a consensus among the OECD States 
determined the nature of the discussion in broader forums like UNEP 
and FAO. The regulatory model, based on a clear distinction between 
information exchange on the one hand and export notification on the 
other, has been overcome only in the last few years. Under pressure 
from developing countries supported by nongovemmental organiza-
tions, the OECD regulatory models were further developed and sup-
plemented by the PIC procedure.167 
The PIC procedure represents an important shift in the regulation 
of hazardous, not just banned and severely restricted, chemicals and 
pesticides. These rules may be the starting point for the development 
of international rules on the production, use, and marketing of chemi-
cals and pesticides. This is true for two reasons. First, the PIC proce-
dure establishes a mechanism that guarantees that all actions taken by 
countries to restrict or ban chemicals or pesticides can be integrated. 
Second, the rules on classification, labeling, and technical assistance 
integrated within the UNEP Amended London Guidelines not only 
support the scope of the more narrow rules on banned and severely 
restricted chemicals and pesticides, but may be understood as an effort 
to establish international minimum standards applicable to all chemi-
cals and pesticides. The Basle Convention providing for PIC168 has 
165. OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE RELATED TO EXPORT 
OF BANNED OR SEVEREL Y RESTRICTED CHEMICALS (1984). 
166. OECD, ÜUJDING PRINCIPLES ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE RELATED TO EXPORT OF 
BANNED OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED CHEMICALS (1984). 
167. AMENDED LONDON ÜUIDELINES, supra note 3; FAQ Code of Conduct, supra note 7. 
168. UNEP, Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal, ENVTL PoL'Y & L„ Apr. 1989, at 68. For the EC's commitment in imple-
688 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vo1. 13:653 
considerably facilitated the adoption of the Amended London 
Guidelines. 
This view of the further development of international rules for the 
export of banned and severely restricted pesticides and chemicals is 
considerably strengthened by the fact that GAIT has put the issue in 
the Uruguay Round. GATT established notification and information 
exchange mechanisms in the early l 980s, an effort initiated by the 
strong engagement of the OECD, FAO, and UNEP. GAIT feit that 
something should be done and entered the field. 169 The discussions 
and negotiations on the rules, however, took place within the OECD, 
FAO, and UNEP. With the establishment of the Working Group on 
Trade of Domestically Prohibited Goods and Other Hazardous Sub-
stances, the international scenario has changed dramatically. GATT's 
involvement makes it clear that rules are needed at the international 
level to integrate the original GATT idea of free trade with the neces-
sity of protection of health, safety, and the environment. GA TT's 
commitment could well constitute the beginning of the development of 
an international regulatory order for product safety and environmen-
tal protection. 
2. Information Exchange, Export Notification, and Prior Informed 
Consent Procedure 
The OECD Recommendation on Information Exchange and the 
Guiding Principles, both adopted in 1984, have introduced a two-tier 
procedure. 170 This procedure remains valid and is used worldwide. 
The procedure is based on the distinction between the exchange of 
information on regulatory action and the notification of an export 
once it occurs. Information exchange simply means that States that 
have taken action to ban or severely restrict a chemical or pesticide are 
to notify the other members of the relevant international organiza-
tions. Such information exchange should guarantee that the other 
members are kept abreast of the actions taken within the network. 
The establishment of an information exchange mechanism involves de-
fining the types of action that require notification: 
menting the Convention, see Commission Proposal 90/C 289/05 of 10 October 1990 for a Coun-
cil Regulation (EEC) on tbe Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste Within, lnto and 
Out Of the European Community, 1990 O.J. (C 289) 9. 
169. Eckard Rehbinder, Environmenta/ Protection and the Law of International Trade, in 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 357 (R.J. Dupuy ed., 
1985) (witb particular reference to the export of hazardous chemicals and transfrontier disposal 
of wastes). 
170. RECOMMENDATION ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, supra note 165; GUIDING PRINCI-
PLES ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, supra note 166. 
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- only final action as promoted by the industrialized countries or al-
ready provisional and intermediary actions; 
- a definition of what is tobe understood by hazardous chemicals, only 
banned or severely restricted, or at the same time unregistered or volun-
tarily withdrawn, chemicals and pesticides; 
- last, but not least, it requires the complicated determination of the 
category "severely restricted." 17 1 
The OECD Guiding Principles have taken a narrow approach, 
covering only final actions and limiting the scope to banned and se-
verely restricted products, excluding both informal activities of manu-
facturers and never-registered products. This approach determines 
the scope of each and every international mechanism currently under 
discussion. ' Information exchange about final regulatory actions on 
limited product categories constituted the industrialized States' origi-
nal offer to guarantee the developing States some minimum protection. 
Mere information exchange between designated authorities seemed 
quite moderate, but information exchange becomes substantially more 
important once an organization compiles and files the information in a 
separate document like the Consolidated List. 172 
Export notification must be clearly distinguished from mere infor-
mation exchange about regulatory actions. With export notification, 
the exporter notifi.es the exporting authorities and/or the importing 
authorities that the exporter intends to export chemicals or pesticides. 
The OECD Guiding Principles originally blocked the efforts of devel-
oping countries to use export notification to impede international trade 
in chemicals and pesticides. PIC means that the exporter must notify 
the planned destination of an intention to export and then wait f or the 
importing country's consent before shipping the products. Numerous 
variations have been discussed within the last few years, ranging from 
stop shipment notifi.cation to a more flexible approach where only an-
nual notification would be necessary. 
There are also various opinions on the appropriate level of govern-
ment involvement. Developing countries pushed for a model where 
exporters would be required to notify statutory authorities in both the 
exporting and importing States and where each statutory authority 
transmits the notification to the other. In contrast, manufacturers 
promoted the idea of organizing export notification between the ex-
porter and the importer and not engaging the statutory authorities of 
either State. 
The prevailing export notification mechanism, as set out by the 
171. GUJDING PRINCIPLES ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, supra note 166, at 1094. 
172. See Gündling, supra note 161; Pallemaerts, supra note 161. 
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· OECD Guiding Principles, leaves room for interpretation. The lan-
guage provides that, if the export of a chemical banned or severely 
restricted in the State of export occurs, the State of export should en-
sure that the necessary steps are taken to provide the designated na-
tional authority of the State of import with relevant information. 173 In 
the words of the OECD and the original London Guidelines, the pur-
pose of export notification is "to remind the State of the import of the 
original notification regarding control action (information exchange) 
and to alert it to the fact that an expert will occur or is occurring." 174 
There are some minor differences between the OECD Guiding Princi-
ples, the original UNEP Guidelines, and article 9 of the 1985 version 
of the FAO Code of Conduct, but whatever these differepces are, no 
stop-shipment notification, not even notification prior to export, is 
mandatory. The roles of exporters and importers and of exporting and 
importing authorities are not clearly defined. 
Despite this uncertainty, the information exchange and export no-
tification originally promoted by the OECD Guiding Principles have 
become part of the national regulatory systems of most industrialized 
nations. Provisions of U.S. chemical and pesticide laws and regula-
tions cover information exchange and notification procedures as pro-
vided under the OECD Guiding Principles. 175 EC Regulation 1734/ 
88 codifies the OECD, UNEP, and FAO international consensus. 176 
The EC regulation wisely avoids a number of confticts over its scope 
by listing twenty-one chemicals and pesticides that fall within the am-
bit of the exchange and notification mechanism. 177 
The PIC procedure in the Amended London Guidelines andin the 
F AO Code of Conduct constitutes a considerable step toward a more 
sophisticated scheme f or the regulation of trade in banned and se-
verely restricted pesticides. The adoption of the PIC procedure is 
properly seen as the response of the developing countries to the OECD 
States' efforts to impose the agreement on information exchange and 
export notification on them. A conflict resulted from the adoption of 
the PIC procedures. The industrialized nations defended the OECD 
173. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, supra note 166. 
174. AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES, supra note 3, art. 8(b). 
175. See genera//y Raymond Hili, Problemsand Policy Jor Pesticide Exports to Less Developed 
Countries, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 699 (1988) (reviewing U.S. and international policies regulat-
ing pesticide exports); Robert E. Lutz, The Export of Danger: A View from the Developed Wor/d, 
20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 629, 642-69 (1988) (anaJyzing the extent to which the United 
States and other technology producing countries regulate hazardous exports). 
176. Council Regulation 1734/88, supra note 162, currently under revision to implement 
PIC procedures. Commission Proposal 91/C 17/20, supra note 162, pmbl. & art. l, at 16-17. 
177. Council Regulation 1734/88, supra note 162, art. 2(1)-(2) & Annexes I-II, at 17-18 & 
21. 
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system as sufficient to deal with banned and severely restricted pesti-
cides while the developing countries advocated a mechanism to guar-
antee that importing countries are inf ormed of the export of banned 
and severely restricted chemicals prior to export. This conflict led to 
the development of the red-fiag approach. 
The red-flag approach is a PIC procedure that centers on the idea 
that exporting and importing States can negotiate an alert list. Im-
porting countries must decide whether to accept, accept with restric-
tions, or reject imports of listed chemicals and pesticides. The red-ftag 
approach can be described as a "control-action-related PIC proce-
dure," control-action-related because PIC is bound to the control ac-
tion and not to the concrete export. 
Crucial to the operation of the red-flag approach is determining 
which products under what conditions should be on the alert list. The 
answer is pragmatic. Chemicals that ten or more countries have 
banned or severely restricted will be automatically placed on the list. 
Those that five or more but less than ten countries have banned or 
severely restricted will be subject to an "informal consultative pro-
cess," to determine whether they meet the London Guidelines and 
FAO Code definitions of banned or severely restricted for health or 
environmental reasons. 178 Chemicals meeting the definitions will be 
placed on the list. This system applies to chemicals subjected to con-
trol actions before the implementation of the PIC scheme and will lead 
to the establishment of an initial red-ftag list. 
A different system will apply to chemicals that are banned or se-
verely restricted after the circulation of the initial list. These chemi-
cals will automatically become subject to PIC requirements when even 
a single government takes a control action "meeting the definitions of 
the London Guidelines" and notifies the PIC body of that action. 179 
However, there is "an informal consultative process" to "assist UNEP 
and F AO in determining whether the control action meets the defini-
tion," 180 a process that places discretion with UNEP, FAQ secretari-
ats, consulted competent national authorities, and experts. For the 
first time, a worldwide mechanism has been established to constantly 
review chemicals and pesticides as to whether they should be put on 
the red-flag list. 
The PIC procedure also confers a key role on IRPTC. IRPTC 
must disseminate the control action to all participating countries and 
178. AMENDED LONDON GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at annex I(l)(b)(ii). 
179. Jd. annex II(l)(c). 
180. ld. annex Il(2)-(4). 
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verify whether they will accept exports of the controlled substance. 181 
The introduction of the PIC procedure has redefined the responsibili-
ties of importing and exporting countries. The OECD model vests in 
the importing country primary responsibility for deciding what to do 
with the information received. The PIC procedure, however, explic-
itly starts from the concept of shared responsibility between exporting 
and importing countries. The Amended London Guidelines clearly 
state that "[i]t should be the function of designate national authorities 
with regard to export of banned or severely restricted chemicals 'to 
implement appropriate procedures, within their authority, designed to 
ensure that exports do not occur contrary to the PIC decisions or par-
ticipating importing countries.' " 182 Although the exact meaning of 
the reference is far from clear, 183 exporting countries have accepted 
their responsibility to contribute to the implementation of the 
Amended London Guidelines. 
3. Classification, Packaging, Labeling, and Technical Assistance 
The PIC procedure does not provide explicit classification, packag-
ing, and labeling rules. Rather, it emphasizes fundamental principles. 
States should recognize exported chemicals are subject to no less strin-
gent requirements of classification, packaging, and labeling than com-
parable products designated f or domestic use. A similar rule has been 
introduced in EC regulation 1734/88. 184 However, the Amended 
London Guidelines go one step further by asking States, when they 
elaborate and implement existing or future harmonized procedures for 
the classification, packaging, and labeling of chemicals in international 
trade, to consider the special circumstances surrounding the manage-
ment of chemicals in developing countries. 185 
The request to consider the special chemical management 
problems of developing countries shows that the implementation of 
the PIC procedure, the information exchange, and the notification sys-
tem is only possible if resources are made available by industrialized 
States to build the necessary infrastructure in developing countries. 
This request has led national development aid institutions and intema-
181. ld. annex II. 
182. ld. art. 12(c)(iv). 
183. Paper Presentation, Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on the Implementation of the 
Amended London Guidelines, lst Sess„ UNEP/PIC. WG. 3/lnf. (1990) (The topic of this ses-
sion: Proposals on Draft Model National Legislation on Management of Chemicals for the Im-
plementation of the Amended London Guidelines). 
184. Council Regulation 1734/88, supra note 162, art. 5, at 3. The proposed amendment is 
found at Commission Proposal 91/C 17/20, supra note 162, art. 6, at 19-20. 
185. AMENDED LONDON GUIDELJNES, supra note 3, art. 14(b). 
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tional organizations to evaluate the incoming data on banned or se~ 
verely restricted pesticides with the goal of establishing the 
prerequisites for import control. 186 
4. Regulation of Banned and Severely Restricted Products Within 
UNEP, FAO, and the GATT 
The existing GATT rules articulate a clear message: any form of 
restriction of the export of hazardous chemicals runs counter to the 
GA TI ideal of free trade. 187 As a result, there is no mechanism to 
allow GATT Contracting Parties to restrict exports for foreign policy 
reasons. However, article XX of the GATT allows an importing 
country to impose restrictions if the importing country is convinced 
the goods endanger health and the environment. 188 Article XX 
presents the problem of distinguishing legitimate interests from pro-
tectionist considerations. The GATT Agreement on Technical Barri-
ers to Trade tries to balance these conflicting interests by asking 
signatory States to notify GA IT if they wish to restrict the import of 
certain products for health, safety, and environmental reasons. 189 Un-
fortunately, GATT has no rules to deal with the problem of deviating 
health, safety, and environmental protection standards. This short-
coming might well be the source of GATT's interest in developing its 
own rules. 190 
II. DETERMINING FACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
CHEMICAL AND PESTICIDE REGULATION 
For international regulation of chemicals and pesticides to develop 
further, it is necessary to determine the factors that inftuence the pro-
cess of internationalization. This conclusion, therefore, should be read 
as a preface to the ongoing debate regarding the feasibility of an inter-
national convention on the production and use of chemicals and pesti-
186. Bangkok, Thailand Workshop on Pesticides Regulatory Principles and Procedures for 
the Asian and the Pacific Region, Implementation of the International Code of Conduct on the 
Distribution and Use of Pesticides (Technical Assistance Project Financed Through a Trust Fund 
Provided by the Govemment of Japan, 1988). 
187. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, 61 
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 224-28; Michael Rom, Export Controls in GATT, 18 J. WORLD 
TRADE L. 125 (1984). 
188. GATT, supra note 187, art. XX, at 262-65. 
189. See generally Patrizio Merciai, Safeguard Measures in GAIT, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 
41 (1981). 
190. For further details, see John Sankey, Domestically Prohibited Goods and Hazardous 
Substances -A New GATT Working Group is Established, J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1989, ac 99. 
For a broader view, especially with respect to the relationship between U.S. and EC chemical 
regulation and GATT, see remarks of Edmund B. Frost, in International Regulation of Toxic 
Substances (panel discussion), supra note 77, at 102; remarks of Robert E. Herzstein, in id. at 92. 
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· cides, a convention on which UNEP intends to elaborate in the next 
few years. This intention has not yet been explicitly voiced, however, 
because UNEP fears strong and immediate objections from the indus-
trialized States. 191 
A. Economic and Political Incentives 
The most important impetus for the development of international 
regulatory mechanisms is the industrialized States' fear that divergent 
national standards may lead to new trade barriers. 192 In fact, the de-
sire to prevent trade barriers induced the OECD and EEC to come to 
a joint solution on the regulatory framework for the control of chemi-
cals. Similar motivations exist in the area of pesticides. The FAO 
Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides seeks to 
develop a worldwide regulatory framework to guarantee the free flow 
of pesticides. 
States have strong incentives to prevent the technical barriers to 
trade that result from divergent national control legislation. This does 
not mean that health, safety, and environmental policy objectives 
should be set aside. They may be pursued alongside the trade policy 
objectives. The fear of technical barriers to trade improves the pros-
pects of international regulation of chemicals and pesticides considera-
bly, but, at the same time, it limits the goals that can be achieved. 
Health, safety, and environmental protection as such are never the 
objectives of regulation. Social protection is subordinate to the over-
riding goal of the free tlow of chemicals and pesticides. 
The difference in philosophies becomes clear when one considers 
the question of international rules for the protection of health and 
safety in the workplace. When such regulation was discussed within 
the OECD and the European Community, the two organizations 
failed to integrate the protection of health and safety at work and in-
ternational chemical regulation in a single framework. Ten years 
later, the negative effects of differing State standards on the protection 
of health and safety at work are indisputable. lt is within the context 
of the steadily growing importance of differing standards for health 
and safety at work that the ILO convention must be seen. 
Defensive strategies against unfair imports can easily be combined 
191. The Draft Model National Legislation on the Management of Chemica/s for the Imple-
mentation of the Amended London Guidelines, Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on the Imple-
mentation of the Amended London Guidelines, Ist Sess., UNEP/PIC. WG. 3/3 (1990). One 
might understand this document as a preparatory document for an international convention. 
192. This assumption is underscored by the most recent initiative of the OECD organizing 
the workshop held September 17-20, 1991 called Econornic Effects of PI C. 
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with health, safety, and environmental objectives. In 1974, the United 
States introduced rules in its Trade Act providing sanctions against 
importing countries that benefit from lower production costs because 
of workplace health and safety standards far below those of the United 
States. 193 Finland has just adopted a regulation imposing a charge per 
ton on oil delivered to its ports by tankers without double bottoms.194 
Despite the decisive role of economic incentives, one should not 
underestimate the importance political incentives. A striking example 
of the power of political incentives is the development of rules on the 
regulation of banned and severely restricted pesticides and chemicals, 
most notably the adoption of the PIC procedure. Extensive pressure 
from different actors has led to a regulatory mechanism that presents 
GA TI with the challenge of bringing the GA TT's free trade philoso-
phy closer to the safety and environmental protection concerns of 
UNEP. 
B. The Relationship Between Unilateral and International Actions 
to Contra/ Pesticides and Chemica/s 
Unilateral action to control chemicals and pesticides has been nec-
essary to legitimate international action. For example, had the United 
States not taken the initiative in the late l 970s, organizations Iike the 
OECD, UNEP, and FAO would have had no incentive to internation-
alize the export/import issue. Another example is the development of 
international rules to control chemicals. Here, the close cooperation 
of the United States and Europe through the OECD and the European 
Community underscores the necessity of developing genuine interna-
tional rules that are adapted not only to the needs of the industrialized 
States but also to those of the developing States. 
UNEP will play a key role in the development of international 
rules on the control of chemicals. Historically, the development of 
rules on banned and severely restricted chemicals illustrates how the 
rule-making machinery could work. Here the OECD had defined the 
parameters of the international debate. lt took a number of years and 
extensive pressure to transform the OECD Guiding Principles, which 
served the needs of industrialized countries, into a regulatory concept 
193. Jan C. Ballon, The Imp/ications o/ Making the Denial o/ Internationally Recognized 
Worker Rights Actionable Under Section 301 ofthe Trade Act of 1974, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 73, 88-
127 (1987); Harlan Mandel, Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link: International Workers Rights 
and International Trade?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443 (1989); see generally R.R. KERTON, 
DOUBLE STANDARDS: CONSUMER AND WORKER PROTECTJON IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 
(1990); James M. Zimmermann, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Labor Laws: Congress's 
F/awed Extension of the ADEA, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103 (l 988). 
194. Tankers: Double Trouble, EcONOMIST, Apr. 21-27, 1990, at 31. 
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that fits into a world where developing countries play an ever increas-
ing role. The compromise between the United States and the EC 
Member States could serve as a model for the drafting of an interna-
tional convention. Any UNEP effort, however, must consider its ef-
fects on international trade, for a solution will only be found in 
coordination with GATT. GATT may require a broader approach, 
integrating not only chemicals but also pesticides, in order to forge an 
international consensus on the control of pesticides and chemicals. 
C. National lnvolvement in the Contra! of Chemicals and Pesticides 
and International Perspectives for Action 
The relatively rapid compromise between the United States and 
the European Community on the regulation of chemicals was facili-
tated by the fact that new regulatory models and new administrative 
procedures bad to be constructed to cope with chemicals. lt is far 
easier to come to an international solution on the control of dangerous 
substances if there is no need to overcome national administrative 
structures and traditions. The same is true f or the regulation of 
banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesticides. The PIC pro-
cedure is a novelty; it is a genuine international instrument. There are 
no national traditions to be changed. An international convention on 
chemicals could benefit from the relatively young legal infrastructure. 
The convention could step into the vacuum in the field of consumer 
and environmental protection, Ieaving space for the introduction of 
regulatory concepts that go beyond the premarket control mechanisms 
that the industrialized States established. 
The development of international regulation of pesticides and 
medicines shows that it is very difficult, almost impossible, to forge a 
common control mechanism. Although the FAO Code provides a re-
gistration procedure, a number of industrialized countries have intro-
duced prior approval procedures that go far beyond the FAO 
compromise. The philosophy of the F AO Code sets the tone for the 
future regulation of chemicals. International rules never should be 
more than a common platform f or States. The States must remain free 
to leave the platform and establish stricter standards to protect 
humans and the environment. 
D. Trends in the Control of Chemicals and Pesticides 
An analysis of national, regional, and international rules reveals an 
overall trend toward establishing premarket control procedures. 
Premarket control is widely accepted in the field of pesticides, and a 
consensus has almost been reached in the regulation of chemicals as 
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well. The best prospect for international regulation is an approach 
that relies on notification procedures and on concepts of shared re-
sponsibility between manufacturers and govemment agencies. 
However, concentration on the premarket control of chemicals 
and pesticides suffers from a major deficiency. lt f ocuses too closely 
on the control of newly introduced chemicals and pesticides, thereby 
neglecting the dangers of chemicals and pesticides that have been or 
still are circulating without having been effectively controlled before 
marketing. Such a focus is also inadequate in cases where risks be-
come evident only after chemicals or pesticides have been subject to 
some form of premarket control. The most advanced industrialized 
countries are discovering the necessity of establishing effective 
postmarket control mechanisms. 
Deviating market restrictions, however, close markets and run 
counter to the idea of free trade without technical barriers. Harmoniz-
ing access to the world market by introducing common premarket 
control mechanisms is one side of the coin, harmonizing postmarket 
control is the other. The international regulation of banned and se-
verely restricted chemicals and pesticides, mainly in the form of the 
PIC procedure, constitutes an important move towards the develop-
ment of international postmarket control management, but so far it is 
based on final regulatory action. What is needed is a mechanism that 
guarantees the collection and dissemination of risks in order to decide, 
at an international level, which products should be subject to market 
restrictions. 
The PIC procedure is a remarkable innovation in that it provides 
for the review of products not yet on the red-flag list. However, the 
necessary controls should be accomplished by a joint FAO/UNEP 
program in cooperation with the OECD to determine the most dan-
gerous chemicals and pesticides on the market and to formulate com-
mon criteria f or testing and decision making. N onetheless, even such 
a joint international approach will need unilateral action to keep 
movmg. 
